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Abstract - Until Solid Rocket Motor ignition, the Space Shuttle is mated to the Mobil Launch Platform in part via eight (8) 
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) hold-down bolts. The bolts are fractured using redundant pyrotechnics, and are designed to 
drop through a hold-down post on the Mobile Launch Platform before the Space Shuttle begins movement. The Space Shuttle 
program has experienced numerous failures where a bolt has “hung up.” That is, it did not clear the hold-down post before 
lifiofl and was “caught” by the SRBs. This places an additional structural load on the vehicle that was not included in the 
original certijication requirements. 
The Space Shuttle is currently being certified to withstand the loads induced by up to three (3 )  of eight (8) SRB hold-down 
.I .po&~tu&exp&emLng-a ‘‘%ang;up-? The results a# loads analyses pelformed ~r-;follr-(4;)-stud-han,g-ups-indic-ate-tha~the- 
internal vehicle loads exceed current structural cert@cation limits at several locations. To determine the risk to the vehicle 
from four (4) stud hang-ups, the likelihood of the scenario occurring must first be evaluated. Prior to the analysis discussed 
in this paper, the likelihood of occurrence had been estimated assuming that the stud hang-ups were completely independent 
events. That is, it was assumed that no common causes or factors existed between the individual stud hang-up events. A 
review of the data associated with the hang-up events, showed that a common factor (timing skew) was present. This paper 
summarizes a revised likelihood evaluation pe$onned for the four (4) stud hang-ups case considering that there are common 
factors associated with the stud hang-ups. The results show that explicitly (i.e. not using standard common cause 
methodologies such as beta factor or Multiple Greek Letter modeling) taking into account the common factor of timing skew 
results in an increase in the estimated likelihood of four (4) stud hang-ups of an order of magnitude over the independent 
failure case. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The, Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) are mated to the 
Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) prior to launch with the 
hold-down post system. Each SRB has four hold-down 
posts with corresponding support posts on the MLP. 
Hold-down bolts are inserted through the hold-down post 
and a nut is used on each end to secure the SRBs to the 
MLP. The top nuts are frangible, and are ignited at the 
solid rocket motor ignition command. Each nut has two 
detonators which are designed to be faed simultaneously. 
The hold-down bolt then travels downward and is clear of 
the SRB aft skirt at liftoff. 
Should the hold-down bolt not clear the aft skirt before 
liftoff, the movement of the SRB against the bolt may 
introduce additional structural loads on the vehicle. This 
“hang-up” phenomenon may occur on one or multiple 
hold-down posts, and the resulting additional loads 
generally increase with the number of stud hang-ups that 
occur. Through 113 Space Shuttle flights, 25 stud hang- 
ups have occurred, and two flights have experienced cases 
where two hold-down posts experienced stud hang-ups. 
Analyses have been performed to determine if the 
additional structural loads imposed by the stud hang-ups 
are within the certification criteria. Currently, the Space 
Shuttle is being certified for the case where three stud 
hang-ups occur. The four stud hang-up case has been 
informally analyzed for some elements (e.g. SRB, 
External Tank), and structural loads exceed the design 
certification, although structural margin may exist such 
that the actual risk to the crew and vehicle is small [2]. 
The intent of this analysis is to estimate the probability 
that four stud hang-ups may occur on a given launch. The 
results of this analysis show that, for an average flight, the 
probability of four stud hang-ups is approximately 1 in 
4,900, while the maximum expected probability for a 
flight is approximately 1 in 1,050 [I]. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Stud hang-ups have occurred throughout the flight 
history of the Space Shuttle, beginning with STS-2. In 
total, 25 stud hang-ups have occurred on 23 flights. 
Twenty one flights have experienced a single hang-up 
while two (2) flights have experienced two (2) concurrent 
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stud hang-ups. The number of stud hang-ups experienced 
per mission is shown in Figure 1 for all flights to date. 
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Figure 1: Flight History of Hold-Down Post Stud 
Hmg-mps 
The cause- of stad- hang=ups has- --been fo~mally 
investigated by the Space Shuttle Program on three 
separate occasions. Among the findings of these 
investigations are: 
1. The stud hang-ups are independent of hold-down 
post position. No one position is more likely 
than another to experience a stud hang-up. 
2. Timing skew, which occurs when the two 
pyrotechnic charges on a frangible nut do not fire 
simultaneously, appears to be a necessary or 
enabling condition for stud hang-ups, but the 
existence of timing skew does not guarantee that 
a stud hang-up will occur. 
There are no specific combinations of stud hang- 
ups that are worse than others regarding overall 
structural loads imparted on the vehicle. 
Different structures of the space shuttle are 
affected differently by the additional loads 
imposed by varying combinations of stud hang- 
ups. 
Other potential contributors to stud hang-ups are; 
a) nut orientation, b) stud alignment in bore, c) 
shoe rotation, and d) combinations of a, b, and c. 
3. 
4. 
As part of the investigations, an analytical motion study 
[2] was performed to determine the potential impact of 
the various factors listed above on the downward stud 
velocity. A minimum ,velocity was determined to ensure 
that the bolt cleared the hold-down post before vehicle 
movement. The results of the study are shown in Figure 
2. 
Figure 2, Relative Impact On Average 
Stud Ejection Velocity [2] 
From Figure 2 it can be concluded that stud alignment, 
nut orienation, and shoe ~ Z ~ o  not result in a stud-- 
velocity below the minimum required separately or with 
all causes combined. The “infinite” timing skew case 
(where only one side of the pyrotechnics fires) also does 
not result in a velocity below the minimum required, 
however, it is very close. It was also found in the motion 
study that the “infinite” timing skew case may not be the 
worst case. In other words, there may be some level of 
timing skew that could result in a velocity below that 
required. In any case, timing skew is a necessary 
contributor. 
____ -- - -  
Additional information from the 85” and subsequent 
flights documenting how often skew was occurring and 
which hold-down posts were affected was collected. The 
existence of timing skew was determined indirectly by 
examination of the frangible nuts or studs. In all cases for 
which a stud hang-up occurred, timing skew was shown 
to have occurred at that particular hold-down post. 
III. STUD HANG-UPS CONSIDERING TIMING SKEW 
AS A COMMON FACTOR 
As previously discussed, timing skew has been found to 
be a common factor to all observed stud hang-ups, 
although it has not been found to be the sole cause of stud 
hang-ups. The probability of a stud hang-up occurring at 
a post experiencing timing skew was determined using the 
flight data from the last 29 flights [3] (STS-85 through 
STS-113). Six (6) stud hang-ups and 99 timing skews 
were observed during these missions. The flight data is 
summarized in Table 2 as the distribution of the number 
of flights experiencing m timing skews. The probability 
of a stud hang-up occurring on a hold-down post not 
experiencing timing skew was assume4 to be small 
relative to the timing skew case, and therefore neglected 
(i.e. assumed to be -0). 
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fraction of flights experiencing different numbers of 
timing skew. First, the probability of up to four stud 
hang-ups was estimated for each number of timing skews 
(Le. m= 0, 1 ,... 8). These probabilities were then 
multiplied by the fraction of flights experiencing each 
number of timing skews. For each number of stud hang- 
ups (n), the results for each number of timing skews was 
summed up to result in a per flight average probability for 
each number of stud hang-ups. The results are shown in 
Table 3. 
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Table 111: Estimated Stud hang-up 
Probability for an Average Launch 
Assuming Timing Skew as a Common 
Factor 
4 ’  
a Common 
Parameter Description 
Estimated Mean Probability 
of 4 Stud hang-ups for a 
Single “Average” Flight 
Estimated Maximum 
Probability of 4 Stud hang- 
ups for a Single Flight 
Experiencing Timing Skew 
affected) 
Estimated probability of at 
least one occurrence of a 4- 
Stud hang-up for the 
Remainder of the Shuttle 
Program (Assumed 30 
Flights) Based on 
“Average” Flight, Risk for a 
Single Flight 
(8 hold-down posts 
L 0 ! 4 in 5 I 
Factor 
Estimated Mean 
Probability of 
Flight Occurrence 
1 in 4913 
1 in 1050 
1 in 164 
Number Of 
hang-ups, n 
I 4 I 1 in 4913 I 
Estimated Mean 
Probability of Flight 
Occurrence 
Considering timing skew as a common factor results in a 
higher estimated probability of four stud hang-ups 
occurring than if stud hang-ups are treated as occurring 
independently (1 in 4,900 compared to 1 in 27,000). The 
probabilities given Table 3 apply to any “average” launch. 
That is, these are the probabilities of experiencing stud 
hang-ups without having any prior knowledge about the 
degree of timing skew that will be experienced at launch. 
An uncertainty analysis was performed for the “average” 
launch probability to estimate the upper (95& percentile) 
and lower (5& percentile) bounds. The result was an 
2 
3 
upper bound of approximately 1 in 690 lift-offs while the 
lower bound was estimated to be approximately 1 in 
64,000 lift-offs. 
1 in 38 
1 in 348 
When timing skew occurs, the probability of occurrence 
of four stud hang-ups is increased as a function of the 
number of hold-down posts experiencing the skew. The 
worst case probability of a four stud hang-up occurrence 
is approximately 1 in 1050 when all eight hold-down 
posts experience timing skew. Based on this analysis and 
assuming 30 flights remain in the Shuttle Program, four of 
those flights can be expected to experience timing skew 
on all eight hold-down posts and thus be exposed to this 
maximum probability. Currently no means exist to 
measure expected timing skew prior to a launch and the 
flights most at risk of experiencing four stud hang-ups 
cannot be identified. 
-Illhe- .key results from the analysis are summzized -in - - - - -- ~ 
Table 4. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Several conclusions may be drawn from this analysis with 
regard to the likelihood of four stud hang-ups. 
1. The likelihood of multiple hang-ups is 
significantly higher than previously thought 
(assuming independent events) due to the 
common factor of timing skew. 
2. The likelihood of multiple hang-ups occurring 
for each flight varies based on the number of 
timing skews occurring. 
Based on sensitivity studies, the likelihood of 
five hang-ups is significantly less than four, 
assuming no common cause beyond timing 
skew. 
It is important to note that this analysis only evaluated the 
likelihood of stud hang-ups occurring and not the risk to 
the -crew or vehicle. Although informal structural 
analyses show the violation of certification limits for the 
four hang-up case, they also show there may be 
significant structural margin to the ultimate load, in which 
case the actual risk would be small. 
3. 
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